When countries need to implement costly economic policy reforms, these often imply uncertainties about their eectiveness for the home country and their spillovers to other countries. We develop a model to show that under these circumstances countries implement too few or too many policy reforms. From a social perspective, too many reforms follow if the spillover eects of reforms become suciently uncertain. Since centralization of policies to correct inecient policies is often not possible, we look for alternative instruments that can restore the ecient level of reforms. We compare subsidizing reform eorts with insuring against bad outcomes, and argue that subsidies are advantageous in terms of requiring less information for implementation.
Introduction
etting the right kind of eonomi poliy eomes ever more di0ult in n inresingly interdependent nd unertin worldF he integrtion of new regions nd ountries in the world eonomyD higher voltility of ommodity priesD or n inresing pe of (nnil nd tehnil innovtions require individul ountries onstntly to dpt their struturl poliies to hngE ing set of irumstnes or to lrge sle eonomi shoks like the glol (nnil nd eonomi risisF etD the impression is tht ountries do not implement poliy hnges or reforms to the extent desirleF woreoverD the e'et of reforms is highly unertinF sn ftD fek y nd gmpos @PHIIA show in their met nlysis of more thn RT studies nd SHH estimtes tht struturl reforms undertken in reent dedes hd often vrile nd even negtive outomesF gould it e tht the interply of unertin e'etiveness of reforms nd ountries9 eonomi interdependene is distorting reform e'ortsc end if soD re there remedies tht led governments to properly reform their ountriesc o nswer these questionsD we develop model of group of ountries where domesti poliy reforms hve unertin e'ets on the output of the reforming nd other ountriesF e show tht ine0ient levels of poliy reforms rise euse reforms re ostlyD outomes re unertinD nd nonEoopertive poliies mong ountries do not tke into ount unertin spillover e'etsF sn prtiulrD we demonstrte tht poliy hnges my tully not only e too smll utD depending on the size nd unertinty of the spillover e'etsD my lso result in too lrge n extent of reformsF his would explin why reform poliies re often not s suessful s expeted y poliymkers or even filF he remedy most often proposed to orret outomes when externlities distort poliy inentives is to hrmonize or entrlize poliesF hisD howeverD often fils in relity euse ountries re relutnt to give up poliy uE tonomyF e more limited form of poliy oordintion instedD supported y mrket instruments nd limited (sl poolingD might hve etter hnes to (nd ommon supportF sndeed oservers hve stted tht proxies for entrlE P ized deision mking suh s greementsD tretiesD ords nd other forms of interntionl understndings should e onsidered @nziD PHHVAF essuming tht diretly entrlized poliy intervention whih indues ountries to set the right level of poliy reforms is not possileD we explore how poliy hoies re hnged in the presene of susidies nd insurneF nder the (rst shemeD poliy reforms in prtiulr ountry re susidized y others who ene(t from themF his retes n exEnte inentive for indiE vidul ountries to pursue more reformsF eondD we explore mehnism of exEpost redistriution mong ountries or regionsF sf d outomes of polE iy experiments n e insured y those with good outomesD this provides n inentive to reform moreF e derive the optiml mount of susidies or insurne needed to restore e0ienyD nd ompre the instruments with respet to their implementilityF here re severl possile pplitions of our nlysisX Example 1: gonsider iuropen nion memer sttes9 lor mrket reE forms to redue unemploymentF ttes hve ntionl utonomy over their lor mrket poliies nd re free to pursue di'erent poliies to redue unE employmentD suh s reduing hiring nd (ring ostsD lowering pyroll txesD llowing more or less migrtionD or inresing or lowering puli spendingF roweverD the outome of prtiulr poliy mesure is often unertin eE use the poliy is implemented for the (rst time orD if used elsewhereD eE use it unfolds di'erently sine its e'etiveness depends on the institutionl environment of the implementing ountry if there re omplementrities with produt mrketsD the edutionl systemD or the tx system @goe nd nowerD IWWUY preemnD PHHSAF woreoverD positive outome of poliy reform will usully hve positive spillover e'ets to other memer sttes euse of inE resed demnd for their produts or euse of migrtionF et the sme timeD lor mrket reforms re unpopulr mong the popultion nd thus governments tend to hesitte to implement themF ell these ftors tend to led to suEoptiml level of reformsF Example 2: enother pplition for the iuropen se is the disussion out how to del with the gret reessionF hile some ountries dvote more expnsive (sl poliiesD others weigh ginst itF yne reson for the Q di'erenes in poliy proposls is tht ountries re unertin out the outE ome of more (sl expnsionF hile more spending ould diretly inrese output nd employment through puli investmentD others fer tht loss of on(dene in (nnil mrkets will push ountries even deeper into reesE sionF woreoverD it ould e tht ountries in iurope simply try to freeEride on eh other9s e'ortsF sf poliy reform in one ountry inreses its outputD others might hope to ene(t from this without eing fored to implement poliy hnges themselvesF es onsequeneD iuropen ountries tke too few poliy mesures themselvesD insted relying on other ountriesF Example 3: e third possile pplition is the qEPH group of mjor dvned nd emerging mrket eonomiesF he redution of exessive urrent ount de(its nd surpluses or the regultion of (nnil mrkets re lso (elds where sustntil spillover e'ets existsD where the outome of prtiulr poliy mesures re unertinD where poliy reforms re not very populr with the eletortes or importnt interest groupsD nd where oservers lment tht ntionl governments re not doing enough @engeloni nd isniEperryD PHIPAF rere s wellD unertinty out the outome of possile reformsD nd the ttempt to freeEride on the positive spillover e'ets of other ountries9 reforms re likely to e n explntion for the oserved lk of reform e'ortsF Example 4: vstlyD glol e'orts t limte protetion hve not een very suessful so fr euse suh e'orts hve n unertin outome s well s strong spilloversF ergulyD too few mesures re tken euse ountries still dispute the uses of limte hngeD nnot gree wht poliy mesures re rightD nd do not wnt to impose the osts of those poliies on their eleE torte without other ountries lso implementing limte protetion poliiesF sn this seD in prtiulrD it is likely tht the freeErider motive domintes other motives euse ostly limte poliies re likely to hve very little impt on the reforming ountryD wheres ountries ene(t strongly from ll others undertking suh poliy mesuresF sn ll these exmplesD s entrlized poliy setting to improve the olE letive outome is pprently not possileD some degree of susidiztion or insurne of poliy reforms might e ple of yielding more e0ient outE omes while eing t the sme time more eptle to politiins nd nE R tionl eletortes thn trnsferring poliy sovereigntyF ispeilly in the iuE ropen se suh (sl mehnism ould uild on existing limited (sl integrtion in the iuropen nionD nd might thus e esier to e greed upon thn in more heterogeneous groups of ountries without ommon history of prtil integrtionF he pper proeeds s followsF he next setion onnets our pper to the erlier litertureD etion Q develops the model nd derives nonEoopertive nd oopertive poliiesF etion R introdues susidies nd n insurne sheme s instruments to orret ine0ient poliy hoies nd evlutes the two mehnismsF etion S onludesF 2
Literature review pirstD our pper is relted to the literture on eonomi reforms nd unertintyF 1 everl ontriutions hve highlighted the role of unertinty for the politil eonomy of reformsF e prominent rgument dvned in pernndez nd odrik @IWWIA is tht when individul gents re unertin out whether they ene(t from poliy reformD they tend to vote ginst itF iven if the eonomy s whole would ene(tD promises to ompenste losers re not redileD nd hene potentil losers would never gree to reformF sn dditionD if reforms re implemented nd prove to e negtive for mjorityD they will e reversedF enother rgument is tht when there is unertinty out the welfre improving e'ets of reform for the ggregte eonomyD grdulist pproh n help to mke reforms eptleF hewtripont nd olnd @IWWSA show tht y eginning with those reforms tht re likely to yield the highest pyEo'sD support for more reforms n e retedF his is prtiulrly the se if reforms re omplementry nd initil reforms eome more ene(il if further steps followF ixplining the role of unertinty in the dely of reforms hs een trgeted y elesin nd hrzen @IWWIAF hey rgue tht reforms re delyed s politil opponents try to shift the osts of reform poliies to the other prty nd their onstituentsF sn wr of ttrition 1 For general surveys, see Roland (2000) or Tommasi and Velasco (1996) . with iF sn eh ountryD there is n initil distortion θ leding to loss in output tht gives rise to the need for eonomi reform e i F yne my think of θ s usiness yle phenomenon or distortion in the supply of physil or humn pitlF sn the (rst interprettionD reform ims t inresing ggregte demnd or investment nd thus ould e seen s mesure of (sl poliyF sn the seond interprettionD government will need to implement V supply side poliies tht rise produtivity or ftor supply nd the reform n e understood s deregultion in lor or produt mrketsF ht is ruil is tht the government does not know exEnte whether spei( poliy will hieve the gol nd to wht extentF e ssume thtη i mesures the stohsti e'etiveness of reform e i nd thtη i re iFiFdF with expeted vlue E(η i )> 0 nd vrine σ 2 η tht is equl ross ountriesF here re spillovers from the poliy reforms of one ountry on the output of other ountries @seeD eFgFD odrikD PHIRAF his ould e spillover from n inrese in investment or ggregte demndD from trde reform or n inrese in employment tht rises output in other ountriesF 2 pillovers re ptured y stohsti prmeterγ ij D mesuring how reform in ountry j 'ets ountry i9s outputF gountries re unertin out the size of the spilloverF he stohsti spillovers re iFiFdF with E(γ ij ) > 0 nd vrine σ 2 γ F ith respet to the e'etiveness of reformsD we ssume tht ountry9s reform e'orts willD on vergeD hve stronger e'et on its output thn the poliy e'orts of ny other ountry vi spillovers E(η i ) > E(γ ij ), nd tht the reliztions of the two stohsti prmeters re independent Cov(η i ,γ ij ) = 0F hile the former ssumption seems nturlD one justi(tion for the ltter ssumption is tht even similr poliies do not hve neessrily the sme onsequenes in oth ountries euse of di'erent institutionl systemsF pinllyD we ssume tht there re politil or psyhologil osts of reE forms α ≥ 0F he popultion or politiins my e verse to reforms simply euse they rete unertintyD government my resist reforms euse they re likely to hurt politilly importnt speil interest groups @otters nd loofD IWWTY qrossmn nd relpmnD PHHIAD or there my e dverse psyhoE logil or helth e'ets from lrge sle eonomi reforms @hjnkov et lFD PHITAF 2 Learning from policy reforms of other countries might be another spillover but, as we argued above, learning is not pursued here. W pormllyD with n ountries output of single ountry followsX
where we let x i e the urrent output of ountry iD x * i the desired outputD nd s desried oveD θ the output distortionDη i the e'etiveness of poliy reform e i D ndγ ij the spillover e'etF qovernment9s preferenes @expressed s expeted lossesA re de(ned over devitions of output from the desired level x * i nd the osts of poliy experimentsX , @RA where we dropped the index i euse of symmetryF i'ort is inresing in the degree of the initil distortion θF xot surprisE inglyD reform e'orts re flling in the government9s version to reforms αD in the unertinty out its outome σ 2 η D nd in the expeted positive spillover from foreign reforms γF he ltter is mgni(ed y the numer of ountries n − 1D re)eting the inentive to freeEride on the e'orts of ll other ounE triesF he in)uene of the expeted e'etiveness η of domesti reforms on the level of reforms is positive if α + σ 2 η > η 2 F por given verge reliztion of the reform e'etivenessD the reforms hve to e su0iently ostly to the government or su0iently unertin so tht lrger e'etiveness of reforms tully leds to more reform e'ortsF ytherwiseD nonEoopertive governE ment redues its reform e'orts s poliy eomes more e'etive in reduing the output distortionF sn ontrst to nonEoopertive poliy mkingD joint optimiztion tkes into ount tht domesti reforms hve positive output e'et on ll other ountriesF his spillover n e deomposed into n e'et where ountry i9s reform diretly inreses the output in ountry j ndD in dditionD inE diretly inreses the output in ountry j vi positive output e'ets in ll other ountries k tht feed k into ountry jF olving for n symmetri ountries gives optiml e'orts s e i . @WA he exEpost net trnsfer to ountry i n e written s
where ountries otin funds for their poliy reforms ut lso hve to onE triute exEnte to the ommon pool to (nne the susidies to themselves nd other ountriesF ixpeted losses for ountry i @nd nlogously for ll other n − 1 ountriesA with susidy sheme eome
where we express the trnsfer in output termsF he optiml mount of poliy reforms for single government follows s
. @IPA IR he in)uene of susidies on the poliy hoie of ntionl governments is twofoldX yn the one hndD they inrese reforms euse those re suE sidizedD thus leverging the in)uene of the initil distortion θF yn the other hndD ountries relize tht more reforms led to more e'orts in other ountries tht rete positive spillovers nd thus llow to lower own e'ortsF gomprtive sttis show tht the netEe'et of n inrese of susidies on reform e'orts is lerly positiveF fut wht level of susidies µ re needed to restore the e0ient level of poliy reformsc etting @UA equl to @IPA nd solving for µ Sub D we get
. @IQA e lredy know tht optiml susidies re positive if ondition @VA is fulE (lled nd whih reppers in the numertorF ht isD if the oopertive solution yields more poliy reforms thn wht single ountry would opt forD susidy of size µ Sub will indue more reformsF usidies help to overE ome the initil resistne ginst reforms due to reform version nd the in)uene of their unertinty tht mde ountries hesitnt to reform in the (rst pleF hould the oopertive solution require less poliy reforms thn wht single ountry will implementD the required susidy hs to e negtive ! single ountries9 reform e'orts tully need to e txed nd the revenues should e redistriuted on per ountry sisF gomprtive sttis show thtD quite intuitivelyD more susidies should e pid out s the spillover γ is on verge lrger nd the e'et of the poliy hnges on ountry9s own output η lowerF imilrlyD if single ountry does too little poliy reforms euse it is unertin out its outomes (σ 2 η ) or hs high mrginl osts of reform (α)D higher susidy is needed to orret for thisF roweverD there should e lower susidies for reforms if the unertinty of spillover e'ets (σ 2 γ ) is lrge euse it is no longer ertin tht poliy hnges re tully helpful for other ountriesF pinllyD the e'et of the numer of ountries n is miguousF wore ountries imply more spillovers nd thus the inentive to use susidies to ene(t from more spillovers inresesF sfD t the sme timeD those spillovers re unertinD IS more reforms rete more vriility in more ountries whih mkes them less ttrtive to e supported y susidiesF husD susidies re inresing in the numer of ountries only if α + σ 2 η > σ 2 γ . @IUA he insurne mehnismD indeedD indues governments to implement more poliy reformsF roweverD sine the insurne is only pid in se of d outomes nd not exEnteD its only in)uene on reform is vi the unertinty of domesti reforms on output σ 2 η F he higher is the vrine of outome from domesti reformsD the more vlule insurne eomesD leding to more reformsF he other hnnels tht determine poliy experiments in the nonEoopertive se re not in)uened y this type of insurneF eginD we n explore how generous the level of insurne hs to e to reh the e0ient level of reformsF fy equting @IUA with @UAD the neessry insurne is given s
. hen ountries need to implement ostly eonomi poliy reformsD these often entil unertinties out their e'etiveness for the home ountry s well s out their spillovers to other ountriesF hue to the spilloversD reE form e'orts will not e optiml in nonEoopertive poliy setting nd onE IW sequently there will either e too few or too mny poliy hngesF hile poliy entrliztion is wy of tking these spillovers into ountD rel world exmples like the iuropen nion or suprntionl for like the qEPH demonstrte tht ntionl governments re hesitnt to shift poliy mking to entrl unitF hereforeD lterntive instruments my e more promisE ing to led ntionl governments to set the e0ient level of eonomi poliy reformsF e suggest nd ompre two suh mehnisms in setting where ntionl governments set ine0ient levels of reform with respet to oopE ertive solutionF e (nd tht poliy spillovers my led to too few reform e'orts y the ountries involvedF sf unertinties with respet to the e'ets of the spillovers eome too lrgeD howeverD it my e the se tht ountries re tully reforming too muh if ompred to the soilly optiml reform levelF xextD we hve shown tht oth of the poliy instrumentsD susidies or n insurne shemeD n hieve the e0ient level of poliy reformsF sn world where ntionl governments reform too littleD susidies nd redistriution sheme whih rellotes resoures ording to the outome of given poliy n inrese reform e'orts to the e0ient levelF foth instruments lso work for the se where ntionl governments reform too muhF rereD the susidy turns into tx whose revenues re redistriuted mong the ountries in equl shresD nd similrly the insurne pyment eomes txF e lso rgue tht susidies re dvntgeous euse less informtion is required thn for insurneF yverllD our results suggests tht oordintion of poliE ies n e hieved y setting the right kind of inentives nd does not neessrily need entrliztionF sn our setEup we strted from modeling symmetri informtion on tully undertken reformsF fy not deling with issues of morl hzrd we were le to fous on the onsequenes of unertinty on reform e'ets nd possile mehnisms to restore e0ieny sn future workD it would e interesting to look t symmetri informtion in disussion of pproprite mehnisms to indue optiml reform e'ortsD nd how ountries ould e indued to revel their true needs for reform nd their e'etsF
